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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the forces behind political integration through the lens of school district
consolidations, which reduced the number of school districts in the United States from around
130,000 in 1930 to under 15,000 at present. Despite this large observed decline, many districts
resisted consolidation before ultimately merging and others never merged, choosing to remain at
enrollment levels that nearly any education cost function would deem inefficiently small. Why do
some districts voluntarily integrate while others remain small, and how do those districts that do
merge choose with which of their neighbors to do so? In addressing these questions, we empirically
examine the role of potential economies and diseconomies of scale, heterogeneity between merger
partners, and the role of state governments. We first develop a simulation-based estimator that is
rooted in the economics of matching and thus accounts for three important features of typical merger
protocol: two-sided decision making, multiple potential partners, and spatial interdependence. We
then apply this methodology to a wave of school district mergers in the state of Iowa during the
1990s. Our results highlight the importance of economies of scale, diseconomies of scale, state
financial incentives for consolidation, and a variety of heterogeneity measures.
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Political disintegration has been the international norm over the past 60 years as the number
of nations has risen from 74 in 1946 to 192 in 1995 (Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg, 2000).
At the same time, the recent rise of international organizations such as the European Union
is often associated with increasingly coordinated economic and ￿scal policies. Within the
United States, a similar disparity has occurred. While the number of special districts rose
dramatically over the 20th century, the number of school districts has declined at a similarly
dramatic rate. To better understand the forces behind changing borders, this paper develops
an econometric methodology for analyzing jurisdictional merger decisions and then applies
this method to a wave of school district mergers in the state of Iowa during the 1990s.
Throughout the twentieth century, bureaucrats, professional educators, and elected o¢ -
cials in the United States encouraged school districts to consolidate. Proponents of consolida-
tion argued that by consolidating, districts would gain from economies of scale: high schools
could o⁄er more subjects, elementary schools could separate classes by grade level, and the
quality of education could generally be improved at lower costs in larger consolidated schools
and districts than in smaller ones. But many school districts resisted: residents consistently
voted in favor of retaining their small districts, revealing that they preferred local control
over the types of schools their children attended, who their children￿ s classmates would be,
and the determination of local tax rates to their own estimation of the potential e¢ ciency
gains so touted by consolidation￿ s proponents. Ultimately, many states enacted legislation
mandating or providing strong ￿nancial incentives for districts to consolidate, prompting
sharp drops in the number of school districts (see Hooker and Mueller (1970) for an overview
of such legislation), and a vast number of these political battles were resolved in favor of con-
solidation. As Figure 1 shows, the number of school districts in the United States plummeted
from around 120,000 in 1940 to under 15,000 today.
What explains the pattern of school district consolidations over this period? Why do
some districts voluntarily integrate, while others choose to remain small? How do districts
that do merge choose with which of their neighbors to do so? In attempting to answer
these and related questions, a theoretical and empirical literature has investigated the role
of several factors.1 First, regarding the role of size, small districts may bene￿t from any
economies of scale associated with consolidation due to the spreading of ￿xed costs over
1We survey the relevant empirical literature in the next section. For an overview of the theoretical
literature on endogenous borders, see Alesina and Spolaore (1997 and 2003), Bolton and Roland (1997), and
Persson and Tabellini (2000).
2more taxpayers. On the other hand, large districts may be discouraged from consolidation
due to potential diseconomies of scale. Second, if the potential merger partner has di⁄erent
preferences for publicly-provided goods, the median voter may fear the loss in autonomy
associated with consolidation. This heterogeneity in preferences for spending levels, along
with related issues, such as preferences for homogenous peer groups, may serve as a repelling
force in merger decisions. Finally, higher level governments, U.S. states in particular, may
either encourage or discourage consolidations through the form of annexation laws or through
state aid formulas.
In empirically evaluating the impact of these factors in consolidation choices, researchers
are immediately confronted with several methodological issues. In particular, standard
econometric models of discrete choice fail to account for three key features of standard merger
protocol. First, mergers must typically be approved by voters in both districts, and the
decision-making is two-sided; standard discrete choice models, such as the logit, are designed
for single agent decision making. Second, in addition to deciding whether or not to merge,
districts typically have multiple borders and thus must decide with whom to merge. Third,
merger decisions are spatially interdependent. That is, if two districts A and B merge, then
the choice set is altered for all districts sharing a border with either A or B. While the
bivariate Probit model of Poirier (1980) accounts for the ￿rst feature and the multinomial
logit model accounts for the second feature, we know of no estimators that simultaneously
account for all three of these features of merger protocol.
To overcome these limitations of existing estimators, we ￿rst develop an econometric
model of discrete choice that accounts for these three key features of the merger protocol.
This approach is rooted in the economics of one-sided matching and thus allows for two-sided
decision making, multiple potential partners, and spatial interdependence. In the context
of this model, we show that, under a seemingly reasonable restriction on preferences, which
we refer to as symmetry in match quality, a unique stable matching exists. Moreover, this
stable matching can be calculated via a simple iterative algorithm. Finally, we develop
a simulation-based estimator, which uses this iterative algorithm in order to calculate the
probability of a merger between any two adjacent districts in stable matchings.
To illustrate its value, we then apply this methodology through an analysis of school
district mergers in the state of Iowa, which o⁄ered signi￿cant ￿nancial incentives for mergers
during the early 1990s. Due in part to these incentives, over 50 mergers involving more than
100 districts occurred during this period, and, due to these mergers, the number of districts
fell from 430 in 1991, the ￿rst year included in the analysis, to 371 in 2002, the ￿nal year in the
3analysis. In order to identify all potential mergers, which can occur only between adjacent
districts, we have obtained a school district map from 1989, just before the start of the sample
period. To examine the role of district characteristics in these mergers, we have also collected
data on pre-merger district characteristics, such as population, demographics, and property
values. Finally, in order to examine the role of the state of Iowa, we have calculated the
state-level ￿nancial incentives speci￿c to each potential merger. Our results demonstrate the
importance of economies of scale as well as diseconomies of scale in explaining the patterns
of mergers in Iowa during this time period. We also ￿nd an important role for both state
￿nancial incentives in encouraging these mergers and various measures of heterogeneity, which
serve as a repelling force in merger decisions.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the methodology and ￿ndings of
the existing literature. Section 3 and 4 develop the theoretical and econometric framework,
which is then applied to school districts mergers in Iowa in Section 5. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 Existing Literature
Several existing empirical studies shed light on the role of factors underlying political inte-
gration. Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004) examine the number of jurisdictions, including
school districts, within U.S. counties over the period 1960-1990 and ￿nd evidence for a trade-
o⁄ between economies of scale and heterogeneity in both race and income. That is, counties
with high levels of heterogeneity in these dimensions tend to have more school districts, all
else equal. On the other hand, they ￿nd little e⁄ect of heterogeneity in religion or ethnicity.
Regarding the role of state governments, the authors ￿nd that the strength of annexation
laws matter in determining the number of school districts within a state. In a study ana-
lyzing the role of state characteristics in determining the number of school districts within
a state, Kenny and Schmidt (1994) ￿nd that the decline in the number of school districts
between 1950 and 1980 can be explained by the decline in farming and corresponding increase
in population density, the increased importance of state aid, and the increased prominence
of teacher unions.
Relative to this literature, which examines the number of school districts within larger
geographic units, such as states and counties, we are focused on speci￿c individual merger
decisions involving adjacent school districts. Our approach thus arguably better accounts for
constraints on the availability of potential partners that are imposed by existing boundaries;
4variation in these constraints could lead two otherwise identical districts to have di⁄erent
merger patterns. While our approach is most appropriate within a single state, the papers
by Kenny and Schmidt (1994) and Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004) are more naturally
suited to an examination of multiple states. Thus, we view our analysis as complementary
to this existing line of research.
The only studies of which we are aware that examine the decisions of adjacent school
districts to consolidate are a series of papers by Brasington. Brasington (1999) identi￿es 298
pairings of Ohio communities that either do or potentially could jointly provide education
services through a single school district. He then estimates a bivariate Probit model developed
by Poirier (1980); this model allows for both communities to have veto power over the merger
decision and thus a merger is observed only if it is supported by both districts. Using
this econometric methodology, he ￿nds that small and large districts tend to jointly provide
education services, while medium-sized communities do not enter such arrangements. Neither
racial heterogeneity nor income levels explain these patterns. In two follow-up papers,
Brasington uses the same dataset from Ohio but allows for the coe¢ cients to vary between
the larger and smaller potential merger partner (Brasington, 2003b), between the richer and
poorer community (Brasington, 2003a), and between the more and less white community
(Brasington, 2003a).
Relative to these papers by Brasington, our paper provides several contributions. First,
while all of Brasington￿ s papers account for the two-sided nature of mergers, they do not
account for the two other key features described above: districts must choose from one of
several potential partners and merger decisions are spatially interdependent.2 A failure to
account for these features of merger decisions may lead to speci￿cation errors. For example,
the bivariate probit model does not restrict the merger probabilities for a given district
with multiple potential partners to be less than one. Similarly, this failure to account for
multiple potential partners and spatial interdependence may lead to incorrect inference due
to the statistical dependence across borders. Our approach, by contrast, restricts merger
probabilities for a given district to be less than one and accounts for statistical dependence.
Second, while Brasington uses school district characteristics, such as enrollments, test scores,
and property values, from the early 1990s to explain consolidation decisions in Ohio, many
of which occurred during the 1930s and 1960s, we better model the timing of the merger
2To be clear, Brasington￿ s analysis does account for each district having multiple borders, and he does
correctly account for all of the possible pairwise combinations. The di⁄erence is that our approach restricts
districts to merge with at most one other district, whereas Brasington￿ s bivariate probit model assumes
independence in merger decisions across potential merger partners for a given district.
5decisions. The failure to account for these timing considerations could lead to problems
in interpretation. For example, if district characteristics tend to converge post-merger,
then Brasington￿ s analysis may incorrectly interpret similarities in district characteristics
between merger partners to a preference for homogeneity, rather than the true source of these
similarities: the ex-post convergence in district characteristics. In our empirical application,
by contrast, we measure school district characteristics during the year in which the merger
decisions were made, allowing us to separately identify the causes of mergers from their
subsequent e⁄ects.3 While we have provided several methodological contributions to this
literature, Brasington￿ s speci￿cation is somewhat more general in other dimensions. In
particular, it allows for an imperfect correlation between the unobserved preferences for
consolidation between the two merger partners and, in the two follow-up papers, allows the
coe¢ cients to vary across the two potential merger partners. Thus, we again view our
approach as complementary to this existing line of research.
3 Theoretical framework
In empirically analyzing the determinants of mergers between jurisdictions, the analyst is
immediately confronted by three methodological challenges. First, in order to take place,
mergers must be approved by both districts, and the problem is thus two-sided. Second,
in addition to deciding whether or not to merge, districts typically have multiple borders
and thus must decide with whom to merge out of this set of potential partners. Finally,
merger decisions are spatially interdependent across districts. In order to overcome these
methodological challenges, we develop a simulation-based estimator that is rooted in the
economics of matching and thus accounts for two-sided decision making, multiple potential
partners, and spatial interdependence. We ￿rst describe the matching environment and the
associated equilibrium concept of stability before deriving the econometric estimator in the
next section.
3.1 Matching model
Consider a set of school districts and the following merger protocol. First, mergers can occur
only between two adjacent districts, and, for reasons of tractability, we rule out mergers
3In separate work (Gordon and Knight, 2005), we are examining the e⁄ects of these mergers on subsequent
school district ￿scal outcomes.
6involving three or more districts. Second, we do not allow for one district to dissolve into
multiple districts, again for reasons of tractability. Third, mergers must be approved by
voters in both districts, and the decision-making is thus two-sided. Fourth, districts may
choose not to merge with any adjacent districts; that is, districts may remain unmerged.
Finally, given our empirical motivation, we assume that districts have strict preferences and
are thus not indi⁄erent between their potential merger partners. The role of these and other
key assumptions will be described more completely at the end of this section.
This merger environment can be modeled as a one-sided matching game. In particular,
a matching is de￿ned as a set of merger assignments, in which each district is assigned
either a single merger partner or is assigned to remain alone.4 Following the literature
on matching, we use stability as the equilibrium concept. A stable matching is a set of
merger assignments in which 1) no district prefers to remain unmerged over merging with
their assigned partner, and 2) no two districts prefer to merge with each other over their
respective merger assignments, which may include remaining unmerged.
Unfortunately, in one-sided matching situations such as this one, stable matchings do not
generally exist, and when they do exist, are not necessarily unique. Consider, for example,
three districts 1;2; and 3 all of which border each other. Suppose that all three districts prefer
any merger over remaining unmerged and further that district 1 prefers 2 over 3 (2 ￿1 3), 2
prefers 3 over 1 (3 ￿2 1), and 3 prefers 1 over 2 (1 ￿3 2), and denote this odd cycle as 123:
In this case, no stable matching exists since any merger between two districts can be broken
by the unmerged district. On the other hand, with a four-district case and an even cycle
such as 1234; multiple stable matchings may exist.5
Given our objective of developing an empirical methodology, which requires a comparison
of mergers observed in the data to those predicted by the econometric model, the problems
of non-existence and multiplicity clearly create signi￿cant hurdles to be overcome. Fortu-
nately, a simple restriction on preferences guarantees both existence and uniqueness. Before
introducing such a restriction, we de￿ne the utility, or gains, to district i from a merger with
4In one-sided matching games, any agent can match with any other agent. In two-sided matching games,
such as the marriage model of Becker (1973), agents can be sorted into two groups, say men and women, and
matches can occur across, but not within, groups. Roth (1990) provides additional treatment of the theory
of two-sided matching games.
5That is, if all districts prefer any merger over remaining alone, 1 merging with 2 and 3 with 4 is a stable
matching so long as there is no pro￿table deviation involving a merger between districts 2 and 4 (that is,
1 ￿2 4 or 3 ￿4 2): However, 1 merging with 4 and 2 with 3 is also a stable matching so long as there is no
pro￿table deviation involving a merger between districts 1 and 3 (that is, 4 ￿1 3 or 2 ￿3 1):
7district j as follows:
Uji = Aj + Ii + Qji
where Aj represents the attractiveness of district j as a partner and is valued equally by
all of j￿ s potential partners, Ii represents district i￿ s inclination to merge with any of its
potential partners, relative to remaining unmerged, and Qji represents the quality of the
match between districts i and j, as valued by district i.6 Utility from remaining unmerged
is normalized to zero (Uii = Ujj = 0). As noted above, we assume throughout that districts
have strict preferences over their potential merger partners.
It should be clear that this speci￿c formulation of utility places no restrictions on prefer-
ences, as we can always manipulate the qualities of the match to generate the cycles described
above. To eliminate this cycling problem, we next introduce the restriction of symmetry in
match quality:
Qji = Qij
That is, conditional on the attractiveness of a district, which is equally valued by each
potential partner, and the inclination of a district to merge with any of its partners, the
quality of the match is equally valued by the two districts i and j; we again defer a discussion
of the role of this assumption to the end of this section.7 Using this restriction, we have
established the following result:
Proposition: Under the assumptions of symmetry in match quality and strict prefer-
ences, there exists a unique stable matching.
Proof: See Appendix.
Intuitively, the restriction of symmetry in match quality places enough regularity on
preferences over merger partners in order to rule out cycling, which is the underlying source
of the problems of non-existence and multiplicity.8 To see this, consider again the three
district cycle 123 described above; this cycle can be equivalently represented by the following
6We do not explicitly model geographic constraints here. However, these constraints can be easily incor-
porated into preferences by setting Qji = ￿1 for non-adjacent districts.
7This result is similar in ￿avor to that in Sorensen (2005), who shows that the condition of aligned
preferences, which is equivalent to symmetry in utility, leads to a unique stable matching in two-sided matching
games. He then develops a Bayesian estimator and applies this to the market for venture capital.
8In independent work, of which we became aware after developing our theoretical results, Rodrigues-Neto
(2005) showed that, under symmetric utilities (Uij = Uji) and strict preferences, there is always a unique
stable matching. While our restriction of symmetric match quality appears to be more general at ￿rst glance,
these two restrictions turn out to be theoretically equivalent. In particular, if Uji = Aj + Ii + Qji; where





Inserting our utility speci￿cation and imposing symmetry in match quality, we have that:
A2 + Q12 > A3 + Q13
A3 + Q23 > A1 + Q12
A1 + Q13 > A2 + Q23
Summing across these three inequalities, we thus have a contradiction (A1+A2+A3+Q12+
Q23 + Q13 > A1 + A2 + A3 + Q12 + Q23 + Q13); and it should be clear that cycling cannot
occur under our assumption of symmetry in match quality.
While these existence and uniqueness properties are interesting from a theoretical perspec-
tive and, as noted above, are clearly important from an empirical perspective, the proposition
is incomplete as we also need to characterize this unique stable matching in order to complete
the development of our econometric estimator. Fortunately, under the assumptions of the
proposition, symmetry in match quality and strict preferences, this unique stable matching
can always be computed using the following simple algorithm:
Step A: Match mutual 1st choices (including option to remain unmerged)
Step B: Remove matched districts from map
Step C: Re-rank from remaining borders and return to Step A
That is, each district ranks its potential merger partners, and mutual ￿rst choices are
matched with one another. After removing these matched districts from the map, each
district re-ranks from its remaining borders, and the process continues until all districts
are either matched with another district or remain unmerged. Again, the restriction of
symmetry in match quality rules out cycles and thus guarantees that at least one border
with two districts that are mutual ￿rst choices can be found in Step A. Our ability to
calculate the stable matching via this simple iterative algorithm suggests that a simulation
approach may be productive from an econometric perspective. After describing the role
of the assumptions underlying these theoretical results, we next turn to the development of
such an empirical approach.
93.2 Role of the assumptions
Several assumptions were required in order to generate these results of existence and unique-
ness. In this section, we discuss the role of the key assumptions, both explicit, such as
symmetry in match quality, and implicit, such as no side payments. Regarding the merger
protocol, the key assumptions were no mergers involving more than two districts and no
separations. Allowing mergers involving more than two districts would certainly complicate
the problem as it would require consideration of many more combinations of merger part-
ners. Given the di¢ culty of empirical implementation with only two-district mergers, we
leave the issue of multiple merger partners for future work. Separations would also signif-
icantly complicate the analysis as it would require the researcher to identify borders within
districts along which such separations may occur. As will be noted below, in our empirical
application, we have only one case of a merger involving more than two districts and only
one separation. Thus, at least in the context of our empirical application, we view these
cases as exceptions to the rule.
In our model, side payments were not allowed, and thus mergers that might increase
overall surplus may be blocked by one of the two potential partners. In models with side
payments, by contract, the mergers that generate the largest joint surplus are the most likely
to occur.9 While introducing such side payments would clearly alter mergers that occur in
a stable matching, we feel that this assumption is reasonable in our empirical application, as
will be described more completely below.
Another implicit assumption is myopic decision-making: that is, we do not allow districts
to consider how a merger today might alter the pool of potential merger partners in the
future. In the context of U.S. states, for example, our framework would not allow Rhode
Island to merge with Massachusetts in order to ful￿ll an ultimate objective of merging with
New Hampshire in future years. While these dynamic considerations are certainly interesting,
they would signi￿cantly complicate the analysis, and we thus leave them for future work. In
our empirical application, however, we do update borders following mergers and allow these
new districts to subsequently re- merge; as will be described below, however, these subsequent
mergers were rare in practice.
Perhaps the most crucial assumption is symmetry in match quality. Given that our
speci￿cation allows for attractiveness and inclination, however, it is important to note that
this assumption does not require symmetry in utility. Suppose, for example, that all districts
9 In a model with side payments, Fox (2005) develops a non-parametric estimator for two-sided matching
games using these e¢ ciency properties of stable matchings.
10prefer to merge with richer districts and that this gain can be simply captured by Uji = yj￿yi,
where yi and yj represent a summary measure of income, such as average or median income,
in district i and j, respectively. Then, it is clear that, while utilities are not necessarily
symmetric (Uji 6= Uij); income in district j can be incorporated into attractiveness (Aj = yj)
and income in district i can be incorporated into inclination (Ai = yi), and thus the quality of
the match is symmetric (Qij = Qji = 0), albeit uninteresting, in this case. More generally,
as will be shown in the next section, even under the assumption of symmetry in match
quality, the researcher can estimate a variety of econometric speci￿cations as it allows us to
control for own-district characteristics, characteristics of the other district, interactions of
these characteristics across the two districts, and symmetric di⁄erences, such as squared or
absolute di⁄erences, between the characteristics of the two districts.
4 Econometric implementation
Consider an empirical version of the above utility function de￿ned over merger partners:
Uji = Xj￿x + Zi￿z + f(Wi;Wj)￿w + "ji
where Xj represents observed measures of the attractiveness of district j as a partner and
Zi represents observed measures of district i￿ s inclination to merge with any of its potential
partners, relative to remaining unmerged. The observed quality of the match is given by
f(Wi;Wj); while the unobserved quality is given by "ji; this unobserved match quality is
assumed to be distributed type I extreme value and independently across borders. The
vector ￿ = (￿x;￿z;￿w) represents parameters to be estimated. It is clear that symmetry in
match quality is satis￿ed whenever f(Wi;Wj) = f(Wj;Wi) and "ji = "ij, and we impose
these conditions throughout the remainder of the paper. As discussed above, this former
restriction [f(Wi;Wj) = f(Wj;Wi)] is fairly general as it allows for a variety of economet-
ric speci￿cations, such as interactions between the two districts [f(Wi;Wj) = Wi ￿ Wj]
and measures of the di⁄erences between the two districts, including squared di⁄erences
[f(Wi;Wj) = (Wi ￿ Wj)2] and absolute di⁄erences [f(Wi;Wj) = jWi ￿ Wjj].
Given the two-sided nature of the problem, multiple potential partners for each district,
and the interdependence of merger decisions, it is clear that no closed form solution exists
for the probability of a merger between any two districts. Said di⁄erently, the probability
of a merger between any two districts depends upon the characteristics of all districts, even
non-adjacent ones. As an alternative to analytically expressing the probability of a merger
11between any two adjacent districts, one can use the simulation methods for discrete choice
models ￿rst developed by Lerman and Manski (1981). In particular, for replication r =
1;2;::;R; a symmetric unobserved match quality ("r
ji = "r
ij) can be drawn randomly from
the type-I extreme value distribution for each border, and, given a set of parameters (￿), the
iterative algorithm described above can be applied in order to calculate the unique stable
matching assignments. Unobserved match qualities can then be re-drawn R times, and the
proportion of replications in which i and j merge in a stable matching serves as an estimate










ij 2 f0;1g is a dummy variable indicating a merger between districts i and j in the
stable matching associated with simulation r. In practice, however, a smoothed simulator,
which calculates the probability of a merger in each replication Pr(yr
ij = 1j￿), where ￿ is the
smoothing parameter, is preferred.10 Importantly, as the smoothing parameter goes to zero,
the smooth simulator approaches the frequency simulator [lim￿!0Pr(yr
ij = 1j￿) = yr
ij]: But,
for any positive value of the smoothing parameter, the smooth simulator is bounded between
zero and one Pr(yr
ij = 1j￿) 2 (0;1); and the average probability across all replications then








We describe one possible smoothed simulator, which we use in the empirical application to
follow, in Appendix 2.
For estimation purposes, we use the method of simulated moments due to McFadden
(1989).11 Under this method, parameters are chosen in order to minimize a measure of the
10As is known in the literature on simulation, a smoothed simulator is preferred to the frequency simulator
for at least three reasons. First, mergers are relatively rare in practice, and thus, even with a large number
of replications, borders may experience zero mergers across all replications and the frequency simulator
will thus be zero. This creates problems for the GMM estimator, which places in￿nite weight on this
hypothetical border observation given that the simulated variance is zero for this observation. Second,
the theory underlying statistical inference for the GMM estimator assumes that the objective function is
di⁄erentiable. Finally, a smooth objective function permits the use of computationally faster derivative-
based optimization methods in choosing the parameters. See Stern (1997) for additional information on
smooth simulators.
11Given the interdependence in merger decisions (if A merges with B, then C cannot merge with A or
12distance between the simulated probabilities of merger and the observed merger decisions.
Additional details, including the GMM objective function, the optimal weighting matrix for
the moment conditions, and expressions for the variance-covariance matrix, are provided in
Appendix 3.
To summarize, estimation via simulation would proceed as follows:
Step 0: For each border, independently draw an unobserved match quality ("ji)
from the type-I extreme value distribution. Do this R times and index the repli-
cations r = 1;2;:::;R.
Step 1: For each of the R replications, and given a set of initial parameter values,
run the iterative algorithm described above in order to ￿nd a stable matching and
the associated merger probabilities. The average of this probability across all
simulations is the simulated merger probability.
Step 2: Choose a new set of parameter values and return to step 1. Repeat until
the GMM objective function is minimized.
The estimation approach is also summarized graphically via a ￿ ow chart in Figure 3.
As shown, the estimation involves both an inner loop, in which the simulated probabilities
of merger are calculated given a set of parameters, and an outer loop, in which the set of
parameters is chosen in order to minimize the GMM objective function.
Thus, we have developed an econometric model of discrete choice that overcomes the
three key limitations of existing econometric models. In particular, by appealing to the
economics of matching and the associated stability concept, this approach accounts for the
two-sided nature of the merger protocol, allows each district to have an arbitrary number of
potential merger partners, and accounts for the spatial interdependence of merger decisions.
To illustrate the practical value of this approach, we next turn to an empirical application of
school district mergers in the state of Iowa during the 1990s.
B) and our reliance on simulation in calculating the probability of mergers, maximum likelihood estimation
is problematic. In particular, the likelihood function is de￿ned over all potential combinations of merger
decisions. Given that, in the empirical application, we have over 1,000 borders, the number of combinations
in quite large, and even with a large number of simulation runs, we may not observe every combination of
merger decisions. Thus, our simulation procedure would assign probability zero to combinations of mergers
not observed in our simulation runs even though every combination of mergers occurs with positive probability
in our empirical model (due to the fact that "ji is unbounded).
135 Empirical Application
We choose to look at the experience of school districts in the state of Iowa during the 1990s
for several reasons. Most importantly, while the state did provide ￿nancial incentives and
technical assistance for consolidation, the decision to integrate ultimately rested with the
school districts themselves. That is, school districts decided both whether or not to consol-
idate (in contrast to some other state mandates for minimum district size), and if they did
choose to consolidate, they chose with which of their neighbors to do so (conditional on the
neighbor￿ s agreement). Second, concentrating on more recent consolidation activity gives
us access to better data on school district ￿nances and the demographics of students and
voters. Third, by looking at a period of consolidation beginning just after the 1989 Census
was administered, we have access to the initial school district boundaries as geo-coded in the
Census TIGER ￿les.
Moreover, the consolidation environment in Iowa arguably satis￿es two key assumptions
underlying our methodology: symmetry in match quality and no side payments. Regarding
the symmetry assumption, our conversations with Guy Ghan, who oversaw the consolidation
process for many of the districts in our sample, suggest that this assumption is consistent with
our particular historical setting. While the petition for reorganization was ￿ exible enough
to allow the two merging districts to write terms speci￿c to their match, it appears that in
practice, larger and more property-wealthy districts were universally attractive, rather than
attractive in a match-speci￿c way. Regarding side payments, we know of no explicit mone-
tary transfers between merging districts. Two possible alternative forms of side payments
regard existing debt and the closing of schools. Regarding debt, two initial districts could
continue to maintain separate tax rates in order to pay o⁄ the debt they had before merging.
Another potential side payment involved discretion over which schools would be closed (par-
ticularly politically important for high schools) following a merger. As pointed out in the
theoretical literature, however, the promise of such side payments may su⁄er from credibility
and enforcement problems (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003) in practice. We next describe the
data before turning to exact measures and the empirical results.
5.1 Data Sources and Variable De￿nitions
We draw on a number of data sources to compile our district-year level data on Iowa school
districts from 1989 to 2001. Our analysis requires data on the timing and composition of
school district consolidations, a listing of potential merger partners, and pre-merger character-
14istics, including demographics, property values, revenues, and expenditures.12 Demographic
data on school districts come from the Census of Population and Housing for 1990 and 2000,
and the Common Core of Data. The Census data from 1989 are tabulated at the school
district level in the School District Data Book (SDDB), and we use the ￿Top 100￿dataset
from the SDDB. In order to use the 1989 Census data in analyzing mergers in each year of
our panel, we created enrollment-weighted averages of those 1989 values for district-year ob-
servations that have experienced a merger between 1989 and the current year. These Census
data include richer variables than found in the Common Core, including the distribution of
adult educational attainment, self-reported home values, and area of the school district in
school miles. Because the Census data are available only decennially, we use the Common
Core of Data for less re￿ned demographic variables on an annual basis. We use the number
of total students enrolled in public school and enrollment by grade.13 Data on school district
￿nances are taken from the School District Finance Data (F33) ￿le, available annually in our
time period from the fall of 1989 to the fall of 2001. We use current instructional spending,
converted into per-pupil measures using the corresponding enrollment variable. Finally, we
have obtained administrative data from Iowa on property value assessments by year and
school district; these data are available beginning in 1991.
In order to identify mergers, we have obtained administrative data on school district
consolidations from the Iowa Department of Education dating to 1965. These data list the
date on which each consolidation goes into e⁄ect, the names and Iowa state identi￿cation
numbers of the districts merging, and the name and Iowa state identi￿cation number of the
new district formed. In all cases except one, consolidations involved only two districts. One
case did involve three districts; given the econometric complications involved with allowing
for three-way mergers, we ignore the role of this single three-way merger in the empirical
analysis to follow. Relatedly, in two cases, individual districts were involuntarily dissolved
into surrounding districts. Because these cases were both infrequent and involuntarily, we
disregard them in our estimation, which allows a given district to remain unmerged or to
merge with any one of its neighbors.
In order to identify potential merger partners, we have obtained a map of school districts
from 1989 as geo-coded in the Census TIGER ￿les.14 According to this map, there were 431
12School districts in Iowa are independent jurisdictions, meaning that they collect their own tax revenue
rather than receiving revenue allocated to them by a parent government such as a town, city, or county.
13While race and ethnicity variables are available in the Census and the Common Core of Data, they provide
limited variation in this instance and we exclude them from our analysis due to computational constraints.
14School district boundaries in Iowa bear little relationship to county boundaries; that is, existing district
boundaries often cross county lines, and mergers also occur across county lines.
15districts and 1,211 borders in 1989. Thus, districts had roughly 5 potential merger partners
on average. Given the date of the map, our sample is de￿ned over the period 1991 through
2001, the ￿rst and last years, respectively, for which we have complete data.
As mentioned above, our theoretical and econometric framework is purely static in nature.
That is, we do not allow districts to consider how a merger today might alter the pool of
potential merger partners in the future. Given our use of panel data, however, we must
incorporate such changes in potential merger partners in the construction of our dataset. In
particular, if two districts A and B merge in year t to form a new district AB, this new
district AB now shares borders with all of A￿ s original borders and B￿ s original borders,
and we allow for such subsequent mergers between AB and any of these potential merger
partners. Empirically, subsequent mergers were rare; there were only two cases in which a
school district, as it existed in 1989, went through two consolidations between 1989 and 2001.
5.2 Financial Incentives
Financial incentives applied to school districts voting by November 30, 1990 to make their
consolidations e⁄ective between July 1, 1991 and July 1, 1993. As Figure 2 shows, districts
appear to have responded strongly to these time-speci￿c incentives. Beginning in 1966, the
start of our administrative data on consolidations, through 1990, there were zero to three
consolidations per year (with 1966 the only year with more than two). In 1991, the ￿rst year
for which districts received ￿nancial bonuses for consolidating, there were four consolidations.
This rose to seven consolidations e⁄ective in 1992 and twenty in 1993. This was followed by
three additional years of higher than average merger activity, even though districts whose
consolidations ￿rst took e⁄ect in these years were not eligible for the ￿nancial incentives.
We discuss two possible explanations for these post-1993 mergers below.
The ￿nancial incentives had two key components, which are summarized in Table 1. The
largest incentive for districts to consolidate between 1991 and 1993 was a ￿ve-year reduction
in their foundation tax rate. During our sample period, the foundation tax rate in Iowa was
$5.40 per $1000 of assessed valuation (5.40 mills). By consolidating, taxpayers in districts
with pre-merger enrollments of fewer than 600 students experienced a foundation tax rate of
4.40 mills in the ￿rst year post-consolidation, increasing by 0.20 mills per year until reaching
5.40 mills again in the sixth year after consolidation, where it would remain. Throughout
this time, the district would receive supplemental state revenue equal to the decrease in local
collections, so that the foundation tax reduction essentially transferred funds from state to
local taxpayers with no reduction in total revenue available for local education expenditures.
16To be clear, the enrollment limit is de￿ned separately for each of the two potential merger
partners; all property in the post-merger district will be eligible for the lower foundation
rate if both partners had enrollment below 600 students. For mergers involving one district
below 600 students and one district above 600 students, only the property in the district of
the smaller partner is eligible for the lower foundation rate and thus property owners in the
two districts e⁄ectively paid di⁄erent tax rates for the ￿ve years following a merger. Thus,
this merger incentive is measured separately for the two potential merger partners.
To compute the reduction in the foundation tax rate, we use enrollment ￿gures in or-
der to determine whether the district was above or below 600 students as well as annual
administrative data on assessed property values. We then compute the present discounted
value of the ￿ve-year stream of payments using an assumed discount rate of 3 percent, which
is roughly the in￿ ation rate during 1991, and, given the stagnant population in Iowa, an
assumed nominal growth rate in housing values of zero.
As shown in Table 2a, mergers only occurred during this subsidy period 1991-1993 along
borders in which at least one district had enrollments below 600 students, and the vast
majority occurred along borders in which both districts had enrollments below 600 students.
While these average merger rates of 2.4 percent appear relatively low at ￿rst glance, it is
important to note that these merger rates are both along a given border and within a given
year. Districts with enrollments below 600 merged with one of their multiple neighbors at
an 8 percent rate in a given year during the 1991-1993 period. Even this district-level rate
understates merger activity given that no subsequent mergers occurred during the 1991-1993
period. That is, almost one-third (31 percent) of districts with enrollments below 600 in
1991 merged with one of their neighbors at some point during the 1991-1993 period. Taken
together with the spike in mergers during this incentive period, as demonstrated in Figure
2, this evidence suggests that districts strongly responded to the ￿nancial incentives in place
during this period.
The second major incentive is related to the practice of whole grade sharing (WGS). Un-
der WGS, two distinct districts do not merge their ￿nances and thus maintain independent
tax bases; instead, two districts divide responsibility over providing education services for
particular grades. A common version of WGS involves both districts maintaining their own
elementary schools, one district having a middle school serving students from both districts,
and the other district having a high school serving students from both districts. Iowa had
encouraged whole grade sharing by assigning an additional weight to students in whole grade
sharing arrangements when making foundation payments to districts. Speci￿cally, students
17in WGS arrangements counted as 1.1 ￿regular￿students. The Iowa state legislature changed
the school ￿nance law to eliminate additional weights for students in WGS arrangements, but
allowed school districts consolidating e⁄ective 1991-1993 to continue to weight their enroll-
ments according to the proportion of students previously in WGS for ￿ve years after merging.
This allowed consolidating districts to retain about $200 per pupil per year over a ￿ve-year
period that they would have lost had they not merged.15 Unlike the ￿rst incentive, which
varied between the two potential partners, this second incentive provides extra funds directly
to the new district, and both districts will thus share in the incentive post-merger. Many
of the districts consolidating, both during the 1991-1993 eligibility window and afterwards,
had been involved in WGS agreements.16
5.3 Heterogeneity Factors
We focus on three measures of heterogeneity: ￿scal, demographic, and spatial. These latter
two measures are emphasized in the work by Alesina and Spolaore (1997 and 2003) As a
baseline measure of ￿scal heterogeneity, we use the squared di⁄erence in per-pupil spending
on education, adjusted for tax bases, between the two districts. That is, we estimate pref-
erences for education by dividing per-pupil expenditures, using instructional spending and
15In order to estimate the monetary value of these whole grade sharing incentives, we ￿rst estimate the
number of students involved in whole-grade sharing by school district. To generate this estimate, we make the
simplifying assumption that a district￿ s enrollment, as reported in the district-level ￿les, is equally distributed
across all thirteen (including kindergarten) grades. We then multiply this estimated grade-level enrollment
by the number of grades in which there is no reported enrollment across all school-level ￿les for the district.
This whole-grade sharing enrollment estimate is thus an estimate of the district￿ s gross exported students.
We then multiply the number of students involved in whole-grade sharing by $247, which is 10 percent of the
foundation payment in 1991, the ￿rst year in which the incentives were in place. Finally, we take the present
discounted value of the 5-year stream of payments assuming a discount rate of 3 percent and a nominal
growth rate in the foundation payment of 4.5 percent, which is roughly the growth rate realized during this
period.
16Both the foundation tax rate reduction and continued use of supplemental WGS weights gave districts
an incentive to consolidate e⁄ective 1991-1993. If we view the decision to consolidate as a choice between
WGS and consolidation, districts may have chosen WGS over consolidation prior to 1991 because of the
supplemental weights. This reason not to consolidate is not valid for mergers e⁄ective after 1993 (although
they would still receive greater bene￿ts from merging between 1991 and 1993), so may explain why more
districts than average consolidated even after the greatest ￿nancial incentives were no longer applicable.
Another possibility is that the school board had referred the merger to voters by November 30, 1990 but
needed more time to build political consensus before voters ultimately approved the merger, albeit without
the ￿nancial incentives, in subsequent years.
18enrollments in the Census data, by housing values in the district, as self-reported by residents
in Census data. To create a measure of heterogeneity, we then take the squared di⁄erence
in the measures between the two adjacent districts.17 For our demographic heterogeneity
measures, we examine the squared di⁄erence across the two districts in two measures of adult
educational attainment: the percent of adults with less than a high school degree, and the
percent of adults with at least a four-year college degree. Finally, regarding spatial hetero-
geneity, we control for the population density of the district, as measured in total population
per square mile, as well as the estimated distance between the two districts.18
5.4 Scale Factors
We are also interested in examining the role of economies and diseconomies of scale in these
merger decisions. Let c(N) denote the average cost of providing education services to N
students. From the perspective of district i, the e¢ ciency gains, or potentially losses, from






For e¢ ciency enhancing mergers [c(Ni+Nj) < c(Ni)]; our measure of e¢ ciency gains will be
positive. On the other hand, if c(Ni+Nj) > c(Ni), our measure will be negative, suggesting
e¢ ciency losses. In terms of an empirical speci￿cation, we use the following average cost
speci￿cation:
c(N) = N￿+￿N
17A related measure that would be interesting to examine is the ￿scal transfer induced by mergers. That
is, the relatively property-poor district may be subsidized by the property-rich district post-merger due to the
di⁄erences in tax bases. Unfortunately, this ￿scal transfer e⁄ect cannot be identi￿ed without district-speci￿c
voting data, which we have been unable to obtain for these mergers in Iowa. Given that an increase in the
disparity between housing prices will increase the willingness to merge by the property-poor district but will
decrease the willingness to merge by the property-rich district, the net e⁄ect on merger probabilities is thus
ambiguous and cannot be identi￿ed without district-speci￿c voting data. See Filer and Kenny (1980) for an
analysis of the role of such ￿scal transfers in city-county consoliation referenda during the 1949-1976 period.
18We estimate the distance between the two districts using data on each district￿ s area in square miles,
with the simplifying assumption that each district is square in shape. This allows us to calculate the distance
between the two districts (from center to center) as the sum of one-half of the square root of each district￿ s
area.
19As shown in ￿gure 4, this speci￿cation allows for a wide range of shapes for the cost curve.
That is, the parameter ￿ describes the shape of the cost curve at low enrollment levels, while
the parameter ￿ captures the shape of the cost curve at high enrollment levels. Thus, the
former parameter can be interpreted as a measure of economies of scale and the latter can
be interpreted as a measure of diseconomies of scale. As shown, if ￿ < 0 but ￿ > 0, the
cost-curve will be U-shaped, suggesting that mergers will be e¢ ciency enhancing for smaller
districts but potentially e¢ ciency detracting for larger districts. Inserting this cost curve






= ￿ [ln(Ni) ￿ ln(Ni + Nj)]
| {z }
economies of scale
+￿ [Ni ln(Ni) ￿ (Ni + Nj)ln(Ni + Nj)]
| {z }
diseconomies of scale
Thus, as described above, our estimate of ￿ can be considered an estimate of the role of
economies of scale in merger decisions, while our estimate of ￿ can be considered a corre-
sponding estimate of the role of diseconomies of scale.
Given that the merger incentives are targeted at small districts, it is important to be
clear in describing how we distinguish between responsiveness to the incentives and the role
of economies of scale. First, we have time-series variation in the merger incentives, which
were available only during the 1991-1993 period, and, as shown above, merger rates were
much higher during this period. A second source of identi￿cation is the 600-cuto⁄ level for
the merger incentives. As shown in Table 2b, merger rates were much higher along borders
with two very small districts, de￿ned as those with enrollments below 300, suggesting a role
for economies of scale. Roughly speaking, we can use the variation in merger rates within the
below-600 category to identify the role of economies of scale, while variation in merger rates
between the below-600 and above-600 categories identi￿es the responsiveness of districts to
the merger incentives.
5.5 Results
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our key variables at the level of an individual school
district conditional on whether or not a merger occurred. As shown, those districts choosing
to merge with one of their neighbors were signi￿cantly smaller than those that choose to
remain unmerged. Moreover, these districts tended to be signi￿cantly smaller in a geographic
sense, as captured by square miles, suggesting an important role for spatial heterogeneity and
20transportation costs. As shown in the ￿nal row, however, merging districts tend be less dense
as the e⁄ect of low enrollment dominates the e⁄ect of small size in the geographic sense.
Similarly, Table 4 provides summary statistics at the level of a school district border.
As shown, mergers were more likely to occur along borders that were eligible for the merger
incentives, and this di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant. Given the complexity of interpreting
the economies of scale measures, we defer their discussion until the econometric analysis.
Regarding heterogeneity measures, mergers were more likely to occur along borders with
less heterogeneity in adult educational outcomes although this di⁄erence is only statistically
signi￿cant for the college degree heterogeneity variable. Regarding the second measure of
heterogeneity, di⁄erences in spending levels, no e⁄ect is detected in these summary statistics.
Finally, mergers were more likely to occur among geographically close districts, and this
di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant. We next turn to a more formal econometric test of our
hypotheses.
Table 5 provides the results from our simulated method of moments estimator. Column 1
presents our baseline results, which do not include any heterogeneity measures, while columns
2-4 introduce our three di⁄erent heterogeneity measures. As shown in the baseline results,
merger incentives have a positive e⁄ect on the decision to merge, providing evidence that is
consistent with the suggestive evidence provided in ￿gure 2 and table 2. While these results
demonstrate a positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of ￿nancial incentives on merger
decisions, Table 6 provides some evidence on the magnitude of the e⁄ect. In particular,
we conduct a counterfactual experiment in which the ￿nancial incentives in place during
1991-1993 are eliminated. As shown, merger rates along borders in which both districts
have enrollments below 600 and were thus eligible for the foundation rate incentives fall
signi￿cantly from 2.89 percent to 0.46 percent, representing an 84 percent reduction in these
merger rates.
Returning to the coe¢ cients in column 1 of Table 5, the economies of scale variable has
an expected negative coe¢ cient, while the diseconomies of scale measure has an expected
positive coe¢ cient. In order to aid in the interpretation of these results, Figure 5 plots the
log cost curve implied by the coe¢ cients in column 1 against district enrollments. Recall
that our assumed cost curve is given by c(N) = N￿+￿N; and thus we can write the log cost
curve as follows:
lnc(N) = (￿ + ￿N)ln(N) (1)
As shown in Figure 5, these coe¢ cients imply that average costs are minimized at enrollments
of about 250 students. Thus, among equally sized districts, the most e¢ cient mergers involve
21those with enrollments of about 125 each, and mergers involving larger districts may entail
diseconomies of scale. It is important to note that these estimates of economies of scale and
diseconomies of scale should be interpreted as those perceived by the voters when deciding
whether or not to integrate. These revealed preference estimates may di⁄er substantially
from the economies of scale actually realized by districts through consolidation. Indeed,
estimates of education cost functions, as summarized by Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger
(2002), imply that diseconomies of scale may not set in until enrollments reach 6,000 students,
although, as the authors point out, this optimal size may be signi￿cantly lower in sparsely
populated states, such as Iowa, due to transportation costs.
As shown in columns 2-4, the coe¢ cients on the merger incentive measure and the size
variables are similar after controlling for our various measures of heterogeneity. Turning
to these measures, we ￿nd that all three sources of heterogeneity served as a repelling force
in merger decisions, and all of these coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant except for the
adult high school degree heterogeneity measure. In particular, mergers are less likely to
occur as the di⁄erence in the fraction of adults with a college degree increases, as shown in
column 2. Similarly, as the di⁄erence in property-value adjusted spending levels increases,
the propensity to merge falls, as shown in column 3. Finally, as shown in column 4, estimated
distance between the two districts, conditional on population density, also serves as a repelling
force, presumably due to the higher transportation costs. To provide a sense of the magnitude
of these e⁄ects, Table 6 provides results from simulations in which the heterogeneity channel
is shut down. For example, as shown in experiment 3, merger rates increase from 0.43 percent
to 0.46 percent, an increase of 7 percent, if districts do not condition on such di⁄erences,
or equivalently, if these disparities between districts are eliminated. Similarly, setting the
distance between two districts equal to zero leads to an economically signi￿cant increase in
merger rates.19
One implicit econometric assumption underlying the results in columns 1-4 of Table 5 is
a lack of serial correlation. That is, we have assumed that the unobserved match qualities
are independent over time for a given border, whereas it might seem more reasonable to
assume that these match qualities are correlated over time. In order to test the robustness
of this assumption, column 5 of Table 5 presents results from an alternative speci￿cation
in which unobserved match qualities are drawn for a given border in 1991 and are then
19The large e⁄ect of estimated distance in experiment 4 may be due to two factors. First, this experiment
holds constant population density, which would obviously tend to increase as the geographic size of the two
districts is decreased. Second, there is likely multicollinearity in the underlying speci￿cation in Table 5 as it
simultaneously controls for enrollment, district square miles, and population density.
22held constant over the remaining sample period.20 As shown, the coe¢ cients and standard
errors are qualitatively similar to those in our baseline results of column 1, suggesting that
our assumption of independence is not driving the statistical signi￿cance of our baseline
empirical results.
In order to compare the results of our estimator relative to those in the existing literature,
Table 7 presents the results from a bivariate logit model under the assumption of symmetry
in match quality.21 As shown in column 1, the merger incentives coe¢ cient is positive and
statistically signi￿cant. While this e⁄ect has the same sign as the corresponding coe¢ cient
in Table 5, it is di¢ cult to compare the magnitude of the policy incentives e⁄ect in the two
models given the independence assumption in the bivariate model. In particular, the results
from policy experiments comparable to those in Table 6 would be di¢ cult to interpret as
there is no requirement that each district merge with only one partner in the bivariate probit
model. While the size of these policy incentive e⁄ects are not directly comparable, the role
of scale is more comparable: the bivariate logit coe¢ cients suggest a minimum e¢ cient size
of 688, signi￿cantly larger than that suggested via our simulation approach. Regarding the
role of heterogeneity, the bivariate probit ￿nds statistically signi￿cant support for only one
out of the three measures. As shown in column 4, geographic distance between districts
creates a disincentive to merge, while columns 2 and 3 report no role for heterogeneity in
the educational attainment of parents or di⁄erences in spending levels. One interpretation
of these weaker heterogeneity results is that the simulation model, but not the bivariate
logit model, accounts for the fact that districts choose one district from their many potential
merger partners and thus more naturally allows for districts to choose the one district with
which it is most appropriately matched.
20We treat new districts following mergers as having new borders. That is, if two districts 1 and 2 merge,
creating district 12, then any borders of the new district 12 are treated as new borders and a new unobserved
match quality is drawn from the type-I extreme value distribution.
21There are two di⁄erences between our bivariate logit model and the bivariate probit model estimated
by Brasington. First, while Brasington￿ s model estimates a parameter capturing the correlation between
the unobserved utility of the two districts, we simply assume that this correlation equals 1 (we attempted
to estimate a model with such a correlation but had di¢ culties with convergence as the correlation tended
towards the extreme values of +1 or -1). Second, we use the logistic distribution rather than the normal
distribution in order to get a closed form expression for the merger probability and to make our results more
comparable with our simulation estimator, which assumes that match qualities are distributed type-I extreme
value. As is well known, however, the normal and logistic distributions are both symmetric and are quite
similar in shape, suggesting that our results are probably invariant to this distributional assumption.
236 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an empirical approach to the study of school district mergers. This
method is rooted in the economics of matching and thus overcomes several methodological
problems with existing estimators. In particular, our approach allows for two-sided decision
making, multiple potential merger partners for each district, and spatial interdependence in
merger decisions. While the model does not generate an analytic expression for the prob-
ability of a merger, we show that the model can be estimated via simulation techniques.
Applying this method to a spate of school district mergers in Iowa during the 1990s, our
results demonstrate the importance of state subsidies, economies of scale as well as disec-
onomies of scale, and heterogeneity in explaining the patterns of mergers in Iowa during this
time period. One caveat is that this analysis, which abstracts from racial heterogeneity, may
not generalize to other states and time periods. Iowa has very little racial heterogeneity,
and, as noted above, other studies, such as Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004), have found a
strong role for such heterogeneity in terms of predicting the number of school districts within
U.S. counties.
24Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition
Chung (2000) has shown that no odd cycles implies the existence of a stable matching.
The ￿rst part of our proof shows that, if there are two distinct stable matchings and strict
preferences, then a cycle can be created. The second part of the proofs show that under the
restriction of symmetry in match quality and strict preferences, there are no cycles. Thus,
under the symmetry in match quality and strict preferences, a unique stable matching exists.
Claim: If there are two distinct stable matchings and strict preferences, then a cycle can
be created.
Suppose there are N > 2 districts and two distinct stable matchings (A and B). In order
for A and B to be distinct matchings, at least one district must be paired with di⁄erent
partners in A and B. Without loss of generality, denote this district as 1 and the partner in
A as 2 and the partner in B as 4: Again, without loss of generality, assume that 1 prefers 2
over 4 (2￿14). In order for matching B to be stable, it must be the case that district 2 is
paired with another district, which we denote district 3, and further that district 2 prefers 3
over 1 (3￿21).22 In matching A, district 3 must either merge with 4 or a new district, say
district 5. If 3 merges with 4, it must be that 3 prefers 4 over 2 in order for A to be stable
(4￿32). But, in order for matching B to be stable, it must be that 4 prefers 1 over 3 (1￿43)
and we thus have that (2￿14); (3￿21), (4￿32), (1￿43), which we refer to as the cycle 1234.
On the other hand, if district 3 merges with district 5 in matching A, it must be the case that
3 prefers 5 over 2 (5￿32) in order for A to be stable. Denote 6 as 5￿ s partner in matching
B. We thus know that 5 prefers 6 over 3 (6￿53). Now, in matching A, 6 must merge with
district 4 or a new district 7. If 6 merges with 4, it must be that 6 prefers 4 over 5 (4￿65)
in order for A to be stable. But, in order for B to be stable, 4 must prefer 1 over 6 (1￿46)
and we have the cycle 123564. On the other hand, if 6 merges with 7, etc. It is thus clear
that, given a ￿nite number of districts, this process will eventually lead to a cycle. Thus, if
there are two distinct stable matchings and strict preferences, then a cycle can be created.
Claim: Under the restriction of symmetry in match quality and strict preferences, there
are no cycles.
Suppose not and let the cycle of size C be given by 123...C. Then, we know that the
22If district 2 is paired with itself in matching B, it must prefer district 1, its partner in matching A (1￿22)









Inserting our speci￿cation and using the assumption that Qi;j = Qj;i, we have that:
A2 + Q1;2 > AC + Q1;C
A3 + Q2;3 > A1 + Q1;2
A4 + Q3;4 > A2 + Q2;3
:::
AC + QC;C￿1 > AC￿2 + QC￿1;C￿2
A1 + Q1;C > AC￿1 + QC;C￿1
Summing across these conditions, it is clear that the left hand side and right hand side
are identical. Hence, a contradiction and no cycle.
26Appendix 2: Smooth simulator
For each simulation r; the probability of a merger between two districts i and j can be
expressed as the probability of deviations from the stable matching. In particular, denote
U￿
i and U￿
j as the equilibrium utility, or value of the game, for districts i and j under the
stable matching. After calculating these utilities, we provide each district a small amount of
additional information (￿￿ij);which is also distributed type-I extreme value and is assumed
symmetric between the two partners, regarding each of their options. The parameter ￿
is referred to as the smoothing parameter. For two bordering districts i and j that are
not merged together under the stable matching, we can then calculate the probability of a
deviation as follows:
Pr(deviationij) = Pr(Uij + ￿￿ij > U￿





j ￿ Uij)=￿] + exp[(U￿
i ￿ Uji)=￿]
where ￿ is the smoothing parameter and is chosen to be small. As this smoothing parameter
converges to zero, the probability of a merger approaches 0 given that at least one district
must prefer its equilibrium utility to this deviation option in order for this matching to be
stable (U￿
j > Uij or U￿
i > Uji). Thus, in the limit, the smooth simulator approaches the
frequency simulator. But, for any positive ￿, the probabilities are bounded between zero and
one. This simulated probability can thus be interpreted as the probability of a deviation,
allowing districts to make mistakes, where the magnitude of the mistakes depends upon the
smoothing parameter ￿:
For merged borders (yr
ij = 1), create a set of willing deviation partners for i (Uik > U￿
k);
to guarantee that this set is not empty, include district i itself in this set where Uii = 0.
Denote this set as Bi with elements indexed by k: Create a similar set for j; denote this set
Bj with elements indexed by l:
Pr(no deviationij) =





k exp[(Uki ￿ Uji)=￿] +
P
l exp[(Ulj ￿ Uij)=￿]
Again, as the smoothing parameter converges to zero, the probability of no deviation, and
thus a merger, approaches 1 as each term in the summation (for example, exp[(Uki￿Uji)=￿])
approaches zero given that district i must prefer j over k in order for the matching to be
stable. Thus, the smooth simulator again approaches the frequency simulator.
27Appendix 3: GMM Estimator and Inference
For estimation purposes, we use a simulated method of moments approach, where the
objective function is de￿ned below:
[I0(y ￿ p)]0W[I0(y ￿ p)]
where y is an N ￿ 1 vector of observed merger indicator variables, p is an N ￿ 1 vector
of simulated merger probabilities, and I is a N ￿ k matrix of instruments, or exogenous
variables. Finally, W is a k ￿ k weighting matrix. The optimal weighting matrix is given
by the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix:
W = var[I0(y ￿ p)]￿1
= [I0var(y ￿ p)I]￿1
= [I0(E(yy0) ￿ pp0)I]￿1
Note that E(yy0) is not necessarily diagonal due to the interdependence in merger decisions.





Let m ￿ k denote the number of parameters in the vector ￿. Then, we calculate the standard
errors according to the following variance-covariance matrix:
V ar(￿) = (1=N)I0[dp=d￿]W[dp=d￿]0I:
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30WGS pre-91 WGS post-91 Reorganize pre-91 or post-
93
Reorganize 91-93 (for 5 
yrs after reorganization)
year 1 = 4.4
year 2 = 4.6
year 3 = 4.8
year 4 = 5.0
year 5 = 5.2
F per non-WGS student F per non-WGS student F per non-WGS student F per non-WGS student
1.1F per WGS student F per WGS student F per previous WGS 
td t
1.1F per previous WGS 
td t
=$5.40 per $1000 =$5.40 per $1000
Per-pupil foundation payment 
from state to district (F)
Table 1: Summary of Merger Incentives
Foundation tax rate (paid to 
state on district assessed 
property valuation)
=$5.40 per $1000600 <= smaller district < 1200 0.00%
smaller district < 600 2.36% 0.36%
larger district < 600 600 <= larger district < 1200
300 <= smaller < 600 1.79%
smaller district < 300 3.90% 2.49%
larger district < 300 300 <= larger district < 600
Table 2a: Merger Activity by District Enrollments




percent of adults with less than 0.2091 0.2062
HS degree (0.0459) (0.0529)
percent of adults with college 0.1066 0.1178
degree (0.0280) (0.0529)
per-pupil instructional spending 0.0801 0.0703
(scaled by housing values) (0.0295) (0.0288)
area (square miles) 98.7517 134.9075
(43.0814) (69.1751)
population density 4.5581 17.3308
(2.2789) (54.3544)
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Key Variables
mean (standard deviation)
Observation = school district / yearmerger no merger
n=50 n=12184
merger incentive 2.4172 0.4737
(2.4516) (1.1630)
economies of scale -0.7772 -0.8420
(0.4422) (0.6197)
diseconomies of scale -3140.61 -11969.15
(2067.28) (28582.14)
heterogeneity in percent adults 0.0030 0.0032
with less than HS degree (0.0036) (0.0049)
heterogeneity in percent adults 0.0015 0.0037
with college degree (0.0020) (0.0098)
heterogeneity in spending 0.0010 0.0009
(property-value adjusted) (0.0028) (0.0033)
estimated distance 9.6427 11.4768
between districts (1.1579) (2.1751)
population density 4.4837 14.9497
(1.9605) (46.2279)
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Key Variables
mean (standard deviation)
Observation = border / yearcolumn 1 column 2 column 3 column 4 column 5
merger incentive 0.5139** 0.5177** 0.5179** 0.3235** 0.5234**
(0.1347) (0.1244) (0.1139) (0.1354) (0.0945)
economies of scale -0.3184** -0.2992** -0.3066** -0.2106** -1.0722**
(0.0249) (0.0211) (0.0189) (0.0347) (0.0382)
diseconomies of scale 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
heterogeneity in percent adults -6.8629
with less than HS degree (8.9018)
heterogeneity in percent adults -11.0788**
with college degree (2.2978)






constant -6.7812** -6.7925** -6.7383** -8.1039** -6.7316**
(0.0717) (0.0654) (0.0626) (0.0748) (0.0428)
sample size 12234 12234 12234 12234 12234
serial correlation assumption independent independent independent independent dependent
Standard errors below coefficients
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
Table 5: Determinants of School District Consolidationsbaseline counterfactual 
Experiment 1: remove merger incentives, 1991-1993 2.89% 0.46%
(merger rates for borders with both districts below 600 enrollment)
Experiment 2: eliminate adult educational heterogeneity 0.43% 0.43%
Experiment 3: eliminate heterogeneity in spending levels 0.43% 0.46%
Experiment 4: set estimated distance to zero 0.0041 11.54%
Table 6: Counterfactual experiments
merger ratescolumn 1 column 2 column 3 column 4
merger incentive 0.4226** 0.4219** 0.4146** 0.2982**
(0.0762) (0.0762) (0.0754) (0.0792)
economies of scale -2.5942** -2.5964** -2.4376** -1.0391
(0.9728) (0.9735) (0.9090) (1.5017)
diseconomies of scale 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
heterogeneity in percent adults -7.9141
with less than HS degree (37.0851)
heterogeneity in percent adults -1.9801
with college degree (60.5672)






constant -4.9715** -4.9401 -4.6454** 1.5591
0.4492 (0.4719) (0.4596) (2.8054)
sample size 12234 12234 12234 12234
Standard errors below coefficients
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
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Figure 2: Number of School District Mergers in Iowa 
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Figure 5: Implied Cost Structure